INTRODUCTION
As digital systems are gradually being introduced into nuclear power plants (NPPs) , the need to quantitatively analyze the reliability of the digital systems is also increasing. Kang and Sung [1] identified (1) a piece of software's reliability, (2) common-cause failures (CCFs), and (3) fault coverage as the three most critical factors during the reliability analysis of digital systems. For a reliability estimation of the safety-critical software (the software that is used in safety-critical digital systems), the use of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) seems to be the most widely implemented [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . The use of BBNs in a reliability estimation of safetycritical software is basically a process of indirectly assigning a reliability based on various observed information and experts' opinions. When software testing results or software failure histories are available, we can use a process of directly estimating the reliability of a piece of software by using various software reliability growth models, such as the Jelinski-Moranda model [7] and the Goel-Okumoto's non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) model [8] . Even though it is generally known that the software reliability growth models cannot be applied to safety-critical software due to the extremely long time required for the reliability to grow to acceptable levels [9] , in this paper, we try to explore the possibilities and corresponding limitations of applying the software reliability growth models to safetycritical software.
METHODS AND RESULTS

Required Software Reliability
We calculated the required reliability of safetycritical software first. It is assumed that the unavailability due to software failures must not exceed 10 -4 , which is the same requirement that was used for proving the unavailability requirement of the programmable logic comparators (PDCs) of Wolsung NPP Unit 1. The testing period is assumed to be one month, which is the same assumption that was used in the unavailability analysis of the digital plant protection system (DPPS) of Ulchin NPPs Units 5 and 6. Based on the two values, the required reliability of safety-critical software can be calculated as follows:
It is generally known that software reliability growth models such as the Jelinski-Moranda model and the GoelOkumoto's non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) model cannot be applied to safety-critical software due to a lack of software failure data. In this paper, by applying two of the most widely known software reliability growth models to sample software failure data, we demonstrate the possibility of using the software reliability growth models to prove the high reliability of safety-critical software. The high sensitivity of a piece of software's reliability to software failure data, as well as a lack of sufficient software failure data, is also identified as a possible limitation when applying the software reliability growth models to safety-critical software. (1) (2) where, U: required unavailability : failure rate (of the software) T: test period.
Selection of Sample Failure Data
To demonstrate the possibilities and limitations of applying the software reliability growth models to safetycritical software through a sample application, we selected sample failure data. The criteria for selection of the sample data is reasonability (the failure data can reasonably represent the expected failures of safetycritical software) and accessibility (other researchers can easily obtain the sample failure data). The selected sample failure data is that from Goel and Okumoto [8] , which is summarized in Table 1 .
Selection of the Software Reliability Growth Models
Musa [10] summarized various software reliability growth models and categorized them into two groups: (1) binomial-type models and (2) Poisson-type models. The most basic and well-known models in the two groups are the Jelinski-Moranda model [7] and the Goel-Okumoto's NHPP model [8] . For this reason, we decided to apply these two representative models to the selected sample failure data.
Analysis of the Sample Failure Data
After an analysis of the sample failure data, we found that after 24 failures both software reliability growth models produced software reliability results. Table 2 summarizes the analysis results of the sample failure data with the two software reliability growth models. In Table  2 , and a mean the estimated total number of inherent software faults. The meanings of the other notations , , b, (t) can be found in [7, 8] . Figure 1 shows the changes of the estimated total number of inherent software faults, which is a part of a software reliability result, calculated by the two software reliability growth models, as software failures are observed one by one. In Figure 1 , the time-to-failure data (blue bar) represents the time-to-failure of the observed software failures. For example, the 24 th failure was observed 91 days after the occurrence, and a correct repair of the 23 rd software failure was implemented.
The number of previously observed failures is represented by the pink line. Because the total number of inherent software faults should not be less than the number of previously observed failures, neither the green line nor the blue line should be below the pink line. The estimated total number of software inherent faults by the Jelinski-Moranda model and the Goel-Okumoto's NHPP model are represented with a green line and a blue line, respectively.
Possibilities of the Software Reliability Growth Models
For the Jelinski-Moranda model, the estimated total software faults ( ) and the single hazard rate ( ) after 34 failures (n) are calculated to be 34.003 and 4.845x10 (3) with Eq.(2), the two calculation results are in the same order of a magnitude. This means that there are some possibilities that the software reliability growth models can be applied to prove the high reliability of safety-critical software when almost all the inherent software faults are identified and correctly repaired.
Limitations of the Software Reliability Growth Models
However, there are several limitations when applying the software reliability growth models to safety-critical software. One of the most serious limitations is that the expected total number of inherent software faults calculated by the software reliability growth models is highly sensitive to the time-to-failure data. As shown in Figure 1 st failures, drastic decreases in the estimated total number of inherent software faults can be observed for both of the software reliability growth models. For the software reliability growth models to be successfully applied to safety-critical software, the estimated total number of inherent software faults (the blue line and green line in Figure 1 ) should be almost constant as the software failure number (x-axis) increases. The interpretation of Figure 1 suggests that the estimated total number of inherent software faults varies from 25.78 to 34.00 for the Jelinski -Maranda model and from 27.32 to 34.83 for the GoelOkumoto's NHPP model as the software failure numbers change from 24 to 34. This sensitivity to the time-to-failure data gives an impression that the resultant high software reliability as shown in Eq.(3) could be a coincidence during the calculation process. One of the other limitations is that it seems that we need at least 20 failure data sets, but we cannot be sure that the amount of failure data results will be generated during the development and testing of safety-critical software.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we demonstrated that there are some possibilities that software reliability growth models can be applied to prove the high reliability of safety-critical software at the point where all the inherent software faults are identified and correctly repaired. However, we also described the limitations of the possibilities caused by the high sensitivity of the estimated total number of inherent software faults to the time-to-failure data and the uncertainty of the availability of sufficient software failure sets for the safety-critical software to be applied to the software reliability growth models.
